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Reconceptualizing VAWA's "Animus" for Rape
in States' Emerging Post-VAWA Civil Rights
Legislation
J. Rebekka S. Bonner
If a man rapes a woman while telling her he loves her, that's a far
cry from saying he hates her. A lust factor does not spring from
animus.
-U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), VAWA cosponsor'
Theoretically, I guess, a rape could take place that was not driven
by gender animus .... But I can't think of what it would be.
-U.S. Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-Del.), VAWA chief sponsor2
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 13, 1994, President Clinton signed into law a major
crime bill that included a powerful new federal weapon to combat civil
rights abuses against women. This crime bill contained the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA),3 a historic measure taken by Congress to
address the national problem of violence against women.
1. Ruth Shalit, Caught in the Act, NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 1993, at 12, 14.
2. Id.
3. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 42 U.S.C.).
4. The Senate Judiciary Committee first held hearings on Senate Bill 2754 in 1990 and 1991.
See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 33-48 (1991); S. REP. No. 101-545, at 29-34 (1990) (summarizing
1417
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
The Yale Law Journal
The Act5 created the first civil rights remedy aimed at violent gender-
based discrimination against female citizens.6 The provision permitted
victims of gender-motivated violence to bring a civil rights suit in federal
court for compensatory or punitive damages, declaratory or injunctive
relief, and legal costs. Its aim was to replace a patchwork of inconsistent,
inadequate, and underenforced state civil and criminal laws with a
consistent and uniform national standard under which to evaluate and
prosecute such civil rights violations.' Equally important was the symbolic
value of recognizing the political aspects of gender-based crimes of
violence: More than random violence, this type of bias crime served to
reinforce discriminatory social hierarchies, thereby harming targeted
citizens' civil rights. For the first time in our nation's history, victims of
these crimes would not have to rely on local criminal prosecutions for
relief; instead, they could sue and seek significant damages in federal court
on their own behalf.8
The VAWA civil rights remedy defined a "crime of violence motivated
by gender" as a felony-grade "crime of violence committed because of
gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus
based on the victim's gender." 9 The key animus requirement was added to
hearings detailing the legal and practical barriers to justice faced by victims of rape and domestic
violence).
5. I also refer to the statute's civil remedy provisions as the "VAWA civil rights remedy,"
"civil rights remedy," or "§ 13981" throughout this Note.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c)-(d) (1994).
7. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 48, 53; see also S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (1993) (noting
congressional findings that "[a] few States still fail to recognize rape of a spouse as a criminal act;
other States do not prosecute husbands for rape unless a wife suffers 'additional degrees of
violence like kidnapping or being threatened with a weapon'; others classify rape of a spouse as a
less serious crime with lesser penalties" (citation omitted)); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love":
Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2163 & n.163 (1996) (noting that
in nine states spouses are barred from claims of intentional torts, either in whole or in part, by the
doctrine of interspousal tort immunity); Lisa R. Eskow, Note, The Ultimate Weapon?:
Demythologizing Spousal Rape and Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REv. 677,
682 & n.35 (1996) (listing Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia as states offering either
partial or no relief for rape victims in cases where the defendant is the victim's spouse). For
example, Idaho allows a wife to prosecute her husband for rape only where he uses force,
violence, or a threat of harm, but not where he rapes her while she is unconscious or otherwise
incapable of consenting. IDAHO CODE § 18-6101, -6107 (Michie 1997).
8. See E-mail from Joseph R. Biden, Jr., United States Senator, to author (Jan. 4, 2002) (on
file with author). Senator Biden wrote:
I am deeply disappointed by the Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Morrison, but I
remain very proud of the Violence Against Women Act. The civil rights remedy
empowered a victim with the ability to seek remedies that were not dependent on the
state, a particularly important right for many women who lived in places that had no or
inadequate state recourses.
Id. The author is a former member of Senator Biden's staff and continues to work on behalf of
several of his policy initiatives. The views expressed in this Note are entirely her own and do not
necessarily reflect the views and positions of Senator Biden.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d).
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satisfy early opponents of the bill, who feared that § 13981 might impinge
on traditional areas of state legislative authority and might be used to
provide relief in federal court for women who had been victims of mere
"random acts of violence unrelated to gender" that did not manifest
invidiously discriminatory intent.'0
In May 2000, the Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to VAWA's
constitutional legitimacy and, in United States v. Morrison, struck down
§ 13981 as violative of the Constitution's federalism principles." Yet soon
after the Supreme Court's initial grant of certiorari in Morrison in 1999, a
handful of individual states anticipated the Court's final decision and
responded with the introduction of their own versions of VAWA civil rights
legislation, closely tracking the language of the doomed federal VAWA.
12
After the grant of certiorari, the New York State Senate's Committee on
Rules marked up a new civil rights law. 3 Current versions of this bill
establish a cause of action covering acts committed "because of gender, or
on the basis of gender, or on the basis of gender and due at least in part to
an animus based on the victim's gender."' 4 On February 4, 2000, the
Illinois state legislature introduced the Gender Violence Act, which would
provide a civil remedy for those who have suffered from "sex
discrimination" in the form of gender-related violence. 5 On January 29,
10. Id. § 13981(e)(1); see E-mail from Joseph R. Biden, Jr., to author, supra note 8
("Although 'animus' was a component of the original Violence Against Women Act that I drafted
in 1990, the specific language of 'animus based on the victim's gender' was shaped in 1993 in
negotiations with Senator Orrin Hatch. To secure necessary support from initial opponents, we
had to narrow the scope of the bill and preserve traditional state spheres of authority-adding the
language of 'animus based on gender' accomplished those goals.... [W]e did not want to
supplant existing state tort law, or create a general federal tort law.").
11. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
12. There has been action at the municipal level as well: In December 2000, the New York
City Council passed an ordinance amending the city's administrative code to include a private
right of action for victims of crimes of violence "committed because of gender or on the basis of
gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." NEW YORK CITY,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-901 to -905 (2000); see also Judith Resnik, Editorial, In the Eye of the
Beholder: States' Rights, Federalism, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at B9.
13. S.B. 7903, 223d Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
14. A.B. 6223, 224th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); A.B. 5682, 224th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y.
2001); S.B. 681, 224th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001).
15. H.B. 4407, 91st Gen. Assem. (II1. 2000), amended and reintroduced as H.B. 3279, 92d
Gen. Assem. (I11. 2001). The original statutory language defined "gender-motivated violence" as
"acts of violence or physical aggression on the basis of sex, gender, or sexuality." H.B. 4407. The
current Illinois state bill is stalled over the broad scope of the statutory text, including the so-
called Matthew Shepard clause (which extends explicit protection to people who are targets of
violence motivated by sexual orientation) and the absence of a narrowing animus requirement. See
Cassandra West, Bridging the Gaps Between People, Parties, Passions, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27,
2000, at C3. This article quoted Judy Gold, Chairman of the Illinois Commission on the Status of
Women, who noted that the threat of an active and broadened antirape remedy has mobilized
conservatives in the state legislature to stall the bill:
What it says is you can go to court and sue for money damages [if you've been
brutalized on the basis of your gender]. You may not know this, but in Illinois there
really isn't a civil remedy for rape. Technically there is, but it's never been applied. The
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2001, the Arizona state legislature introduced a bill creating a private cause
of action for victims of "act[s] of violence motivated by gender" that were
"due in whole or in any part to an animus based on the victim's gender." 6
Now that the federal VAWA civil rights remedy has been declared
unconstitutional, it is likely that other states will join Arizona, Illinois, and
New York in introducing similar legislation creating a state-based civil
right to be free from gender-motivated violence. 7 Unfortunately, however,
these states now find themselves caught in a political dilemma: The very
ambiguity of an animus term, the inclusion of which makes passage of
these state VAWAs possible, could eventually result in an interpretive
struggle in the courts similar to the struggle in the federal courts after
passage of the federal VAWA.
The absence of federalism concerns at the state level would appear to
make it easier for state legislators to add creative alternative definitions of
animus to these statutes, or even to drop this difficult term from their drafts
altogether. Yet political realities seem to dictate that animus be included in
any successful state bill. Indeed, the Arizona and New York statutes are
virtual clones of the federal VAWA, and these legislatures have embraced
the coalition-building pragmatism in the federal VAWA's textual
ambiguities to shelve political arguments concerning the bill's scope and
legislative reach. 8 These bills are proceeding steadily through hearings and
markups. (At the same time, Illinois's most current draft drops the original
animus language of the federal VAWA and contains alternative language to
broaden the scope of the bill.' 9 These moves have led to political problems
in getting the Illinois VAWA bill passed, and that legislation now appears
to be stalled.20 ) The likely adoption of animus language in state-level
governor supported this act and the mayor supported it, but the Republicans in the
Illinois legislature did not support it because it protects people based on their sexual
orientation. Many of those legislators said, "If you would just take the sexual
orientation piece out, we'll vote for it."
Id. (alteration in original).
16. S.B. 1550, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2001).
17. In addition, three states--California, Michigan, and Vermont-have passed hate crime
statutes that include civil penalties for gender-motivated violence. See CTR. FOR WOMEN POLICY
STUDIES, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AS BIAS MOTIVATED HATE CRIME 15-17 (1991).
18. See E-mail from Joseph R. Biden, Jr., to author, supra note 8 (" [I]t made sense legally to
model the civil rights remedy on the language used in other statutes that protect civil fights.
Relying on the existing civil rights language also reinforced one of the fundamental messages in
the Violence Against Women Act, that is, violence against women is not a private, familial matter,
but rather, it is systematic discrimination against women that requires federal action, just like any
other kind of discrimination."); see also Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and
Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, I I WIS. WOMEN'S L.J.
1, 26-33 (1996) (noting the plurality of meanings ascribed to the animus term by various members
of Congress during the legislative debate).
19. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
20. See West, supra note 15.
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VAWA statutes ensures that the struggle over the definition of animus has
not ended with the death of the federal VAWA.
This Note examines the constructions of animus available from existing
jurisprudential and legislative sources in an effort to define an innovative
legal meaning and role for this undefined statutory term within states' new
VAWA legislation. The purpose of the Note is twofold: first, to analyze
available sources of meanings to discover current constructions of the
meaning of animus; and second, to engage in a reconstruction of these
meanings in order to develop the proper future definition for this element
within the context of the post-VAWA civil rights remedies now emerging
in the wake of the federal remedy's demise.
In Part II, I turn to the heated congressional debate over the federal
VAWA in order to examine the competing notions of animus that vied for
adoption in the new Act but that ultimately produced the politically
necessary cloud of ambiguity surrounding this statutory requirement. Parts
III-V examine the scope and limitations of current constructions of animus
under three jurisprudential traditions--civil rights law, Title VII
antidiscrimination case law, and hate crimes legislation-each intended by
VAWA's drafters to be a source of guidance for federal courts'
interpretations of VAWA's animus requirement. As we shall see, each of
the existing legal categories had something to offer to (and something to
take away from) the original goals and eventual scope of the federal
VAWA civil rights remedy. In Part VI, I examine the body of available
federal VAWA jurisprudence for additional insights into potential animus
meanings.
Finally, Part VII reconceptualizes the role of animus under the new
state versions of VAWA, considering what would be the most appropriate
meaning for this statutory term given political realities and the original
vision of the law. Animus is the linchpin term that will determine the
ultimate scope and effectiveness of the states' future VAWA remedies in
realizing the federal law's promise for equal citizenship within a society
free of gender-based violence. As seen at the federal level, unguided courts
chose to read animus restrictively or inconsistently. Continuing ambiguity
of animus promises to limit severely the scope and effectiveness of the state
VAWA statutes.
As courts applied the federal VAWA in individual cases, inconsistent
jurisprudential treatment of rape claims resulted in some courts holding that
some rapes satisfied the animus element while other rapes were denied
relief. The Note reveals that this inconsistent jurisprudential treatment of
rape claims at the federal level is not analytically defensible. All rapes
necessarily contain an inherent gender animus; the minimum level of civil
rights coverage for a truly transformative state VAWA statute therefore
requires relief for all claims involving gender-motivated rape. To that end, I
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offer a definition of animus that would make these new state VAWAs
responsive to all future claimants who have survived a rape. Although a few
states do provide civil remedies for the specific crime of rape, these are
often underenforced, in part due to their secondary status as the "damages
counterpart law" to an existing and primary criminal rape statute. Even
where these civil rape statutes are applied, they fail to capture fully the
harm the victim experiences, and suffer from underinclusion in failing to
address a broad range of nonrape violence that takes place due to victims'
gender. Civil rape statutes fail to recognize the political harms caused by
rape.
For these reasons, states seeking to create societies marked by gender
equality among their citizens must provide civil rights remedies that
recognize that gender-motivated violence is a civil rights issue as well as a
criminal one. By explicit legislative language or through judicially
discoverable expressions of legislative intent, states should adopt a
construction of animus as "[a]n attitude that informs one's actions" or
one's "disposition"'" in order to ensure that these fledgling civil rights
remedies most effectively advance the goal of a society free from violent
acts of discrimination within existing political realities.
II. LEGISLATIVE INTENT-BASED CONSTRUCTIONS OF ANIMUS
UNDER VAWA
VAWA took many different forms in both the House and the Senate:
All tolled, there were at least fourteen versions of VAWA, with additional
changes made during final consideration of the bill on the floor of the
Senate. Senate Bill 2754, the first version of VAWA, was introduced in the
Senate by Senator Joseph Biden on June 19, 1990. As originally drafted,
Title III of Senate Bill 2754 created a new private cause of action for
individual victims of gender-motivated violence, with a "crime of violence
motivated by the victim's gender" defined as "any rape, sexual assault, or
abusive sexual contact motivated by gender-based animus." 22 At first, Title
III covered only sex-related crimes; however, new language incorporated
before markup broadened the remedy to include all crimes of violence
motivated by gender, not just an enumerated list of sex-related violence.23
21. AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 54 (3d ed. 2000).
22. S. 2754, 101st Cong. § 301(d), 136 CONG. REC. 14,564, 14,569 (1990); see also Nourse,
supra note 18, at 7 & n.31.
23. S. 2754, 101st Cong. § 301(b)-(d) (1990), reprinted in S. REP. No. 101-545, at 23 (1990)
(creating a cause of action covering crimes of violence "overwhelmingly motivated by the
victim's gender[,] .. including any rape, sexual assault, or abusive conduct, motivated by
gender"); see also Nourse, supra note 18, at 12 & n.62. The requirement that the violence be
"overwhelmingly" motivated by gender was later removed. See id. at 12 & n.66.
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This version no longer included an "animus" requirement. The new
VAWA, Senate Bill 15, was reintroduced in 1991.24
Soon, however, opposition to the newly expanded VAWA civil rights
remedy began to grow. On January 31, 1991, two weeks after the bill was
introduced in the 102d Congress, the Conference of Chief Justices of State
Supreme Courts voted to oppose Senate Bill 15's civil rights remedy.25 Two
months later, Chief Justice Rehnquist warned that "the bill's new private
right of action... could involve the federal courts in a whole host of
domestic relations disputes" and flood the already overburdened federal
judiciary with new claims."
In May 1993, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), then the ranking minority
member of the Judiciary Committee, agreed with the then-Chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), to address these and
other concerns of VAWA' s opponents by negotiating a mutually acceptable
draft VAWA legislation. At the time of the agreement, there also remained
a significant risk that the bill would be stalled if it were turned into a
legislative vehicle for unrelated, deeply controversial "poison pill"
amendments." Anticipating that bipartisan support would forestall
attachment of hostile floor amendments, Senators Biden and Hatch agreed
to draft new compromise VAWA language based on Biden's original and
on several provisions of Senate Bill 8, Hatch's domestic violence bill.28
Still, opponents remained concerned that without further clarifying
language, courts and activist judges would construe the remedy broadly to
the point that "every crime against a woman" would be considered a "civil
rights violation."" As drafted in Senate Bill 11 and the final Senate Bill 15,
the substitute language required that the crime be sufficiently substantial to
be eligible for federal felony-level prosecution. In addition, Biden and
Hatch's agreement led to compromise language that would both clarify the
kind of proof required and address critics' arguments that every crime
24. S. 15, 102d Cong. § 301(d) (1991).
25. See Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 314-17 (1991) (stating the official position of the
Conference of Chief Justices).
26. 138 CONG. REc. 581, 583 (1992) (reprinting a report on the state of the federal judiciary
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, in which he specifically identified Senate Bill 15 as an unnecessary
additional burden on the federal judiciary). Although supportive of VAWA's overall goals, Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated quite clearly that he opposed VAWA's new criminal and civil rights
provisions, stating that the Act's "definition of a new crime is so open-ended, and the new private
right of action so sweeping, that the legislation could involve the federal courts in a whole host of
domestic relations disputes." Id.; see Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying,
Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269, 272-73
(2000) (detailing the judiciary's opposition to VAWA).
27. See Nourse, supra note 18, at 27 ("Supporters feared that VAWA would become a
vehicle for unrelated, and extremely controversial, crime amendments such as the federal death
penalty, habeas corpus reform, or gun control legislation.").
28. See E-mail from Joseph R. Biden, Jr., to author, supra note 8.
29. Nourse, supra note 18, at 29 & n.156 (citing a Department of Justice position paper).
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against a woman would become a civil rights violation. The new language
in Senate Bill 11 and Senate Bill 15 required that the acts be "committed
because of gender or on the basis of gender" but added the requirement that
the acts must be "due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's
gender." 30
This political compromise among members of the judiciary, as well as
between Democrats and Republicans in Congress, on VAWA's statutory
animus language did not appear to be significantly different from that
contained in the original 1990 Senate draft, Senate Bill 2354, which had
originally required that the crime be "motivated by gender-based animus."
In fact, however, the reformulation marked the culmination of a four-year
tug of war-a middle-ground position between two very different
definitions and standards of animus proof that previously had been
espoused by the two political parties.
A. Conservatives: Animus as "Malice" or "Hatred"
The first position, favored by Republicans, was the "malice/animosity"
standard.3" Under this approach, VAWA would have contained a standard
of animus proof requiring that the defendant "hated" all members of the
opposite gender or consciously intended to use violence as an expression
and message of gender hatred. Had this standard prevailed, it would have
created a higher burden on VAWA plaintiffs than that required of plaintiffs
in other civil rights or hate crimes litigation: Section 1985(3) does not
require a showing of "malicious," rather than benign, discrimination; Title
VII does not require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant "hated" all
women to show that the defendant sexually harassed an individual plaintiff;
and hate crime laws do not require a showing of hatred of all members of
the victim class.32 Indeed, the conservatives' proposed definition for
VAWA's animus requirement threatened to impose the most onerous and
restrictive standard of proof in all of civil rights law.
B. Liberals: Animus as Reflected in "Disparate Impact"
The second position, enjoying informal liberal support, was the
"disparate impact" standard embodied in Title VII law, which the drafters
30. S. 11, 103d Cong. § 301(d)(1) (1993), quoted in Nourse, supra note 18, at 29 & n.157.
31. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REc. 17,459 (1991) (statement of Sen. Dole) (proposing an
amendment providing a damage remedy only for crimes of violence "committed because of
animosity or bias based on gender").
32. See Nourse, supra note 18, at 29-30 (citing Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993) (§ 1985(3)); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (Title
VII); and Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (hate crimes)).
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had indicated should be one source of interpretive guidance for courts
evaluating future VAWA claims.33 Under such a standard, a VAWA
plaintiff would only need to show that the particular act of violence had
resulted in a disproportionately greater impact on the plaintiff's gender
class, with no inquiry into the motivation of the defendant. Opponents of
the bill seized the possibility of this interpretation to charge that the scope
of § 13981 would become too broad,' covering all kinds of violence as
long as it had a disparate impact on women. However, the drafters of the
VAWA civil rights remedy had long appeared to intend an additional
requirement-inquiry into the defendant's motivation-that would have
seemed to preclude use of the animus term as a proxy for deployment of a
statistics-based disproportionate impact standard.35
C. Political Compromise: Animus as "Purpose'" or "Animating Force"
The compromise meaning given to the animus element of the federal
VAWA ultimately settled around a definition akin to "purpose" or
"animating force." Under these interpretations, animus would still focus
the inquiry on the defendant's decision to commit the crime. But while the
standard raised the burden of proof above a showing of disparate impact, it
defined that standard well below terms of "hatred" or "malice."
It is worth noting that with this new intermediate animus standard, the
possibility still existed that a VAWA defendant need not have been
conscious of the motive of bias in committing the violence: The civil rights
remedy could have been read to permit the use of circumstantial evidence
of implicit bias motivation rather than requiring explicit indicia of intent.
Under this potential interpretation, a VAWA plaintiff might only have to
show that the crime or the victim was purposely chosen because of the
victim's gender. This would therefore seem to provide redress for any
violent act used to enforce gender roles and that would prevent (or sanction)
the victim's exercise of her civil rights and liberties. Indeed, all rapes may
be seen as a weapon of degradation and subjugation, and the new state-
based VAWA remedies now have an opportunity to select an animus
meaning commensurate with the recognition of the political ends
effectuated by means of rape. However, in the absence of clear legislative
intent, interpretive language, and political consensus as to the meaning of
animus, such an expansive view of animus would not likely be adopted
widely in the federal courts.
33. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52-53 (1993).
34. See Resnik, supra note 26 (cataloguing the sources and nature of opposition to VAWA
based on concerns of the scope of redress).
35. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 49 (1991) ("Discriminatory motivation is clearly required by
title III of the Violence Against Women Act ... ").
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D. The Resulting Ambiguity of Animus
As noted previously, VAWA's requirement of animus was necessary to
respond to federalism concerns that the new federal legislation not preempt,
but merely supplement, the traditionally recognized prerogative of
individual states to legislate within the areas of tort and criminal law.36 The
animus element operated to ensure that random acts of violence could not
satisfy the gender-motive requirement and therefore would not support a
successful civil cause of action under the statute.37 By adding the
requirement that the violence be motivated by discriminatory "animus
based, in part, on the victim's gender," Senators Biden and Hatch sought to
reassure opponents that § 13981 would only reach violent discriminatory
conduct that transcended state tort and criminal law.38
Yet the limits imposed by the filter term were left vague by VAWA's
pragmatic proponents, who had little incentive to clarify the meaning of
animus in the extremely contentious political climate surrounding the
legislative debate. Intentionally patterned after language used in prior civil
rights legislation,39 this language allowed for the political compromises
necessary to pass the bill. At the same time, however, the indeterminate and
amorphous concept of gender animus ensured that there would be future
difficulty in determining the meaning of this element of VAWA's civil
rights remedy.4" The lack of concrete meaning left little guidance for the
federal courts, which struggled mightily, both as a semantic matter and in
the face of perceived Commerce Clause problems, to apply the ambiguous
concept of animus with only a handful of VAWA § 13981 precedents and
imperfectly analogous civil rights laws to guide them.
In short, the compromise's drafters agreed to imbue animus with a
meaning equated more closely with "purpose" or "intent." 4 Of course, the
36. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (noting that "states
historically have been sovereign" in the areas of criminal law, family law, and education). But see
Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998)
(rebutting the basis for the legal tradition of reserving these areas of legislative power to the states
and noting that this division of legislative labor does not have a constitutional or historically
justifiable foundation); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the
Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 644-53 (2001) (pointing out that the federal government has a history
of regulating family life).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1) (1994); see also S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 49 ("The
committee is not asserting that all crimes against women are gender-motivated.").
38. S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 49. Accordingly, they would later ground VAWA's claim of
legislative authority in both the Commerce Clause, a traditional power used to justify civil rights
legislation, and the Fourteenth Amendment.
39. See E-mail from Joseph R. Biden, Jr., to author, supra note 8.
40. See Adam Candeub, Comment, Motive Crimes and Other Minds, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
2071, 2074 (1994) (questioning how courts would determine whether crimes were motivated by
gender when intent is difficult to determine in the most obvious criminal cases).
41. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 64 ("The defendant must have had a specific intent or
purpose, based on the victim's gender, to injure the victim.").
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meanings of these words were far from settled themselves. Were these
words to be synonymous with "motivation"? Or were they analogues of
their counterparts within the criminal law, where "intent" generally means
desire to commit an act and "purpose" requires something akin to
conscious object to engage in the particular conduct in question?42 Drafters
left quite unclear the ways in which these terms were to be interpreted by
courts. In any event, the legislative history did explicitly direct courts to
look to civil rights, Title VII, and hate crimes case law when applying
VAWA's civil rights remedy.4 3
III. ANIMUS MEANINGS AS DEVELOPED IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASE LAW
It is no coincidence that the language of VAWA's civil rights remedy
came to resemble closely the language found in Reconstruction-era civil
rights statutes permitting federal prosecution of bias-related violence
directed at citizens on the basis of race.' By invoking an existing civil
rights tradition, VAWA's proponents could gain political cover from the
enormously successful and now largely unassailable black civil rights laws
and other antidiscrimination legislation.45 Mimicking the language used in
these lines of jurisprudence would serve to rally support for the new civil
rights remedy and make it more difficult for opponents to work actively
against the bill. This Part explores and considers the existing legal and
political etymology of the term "animus" from its origins in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3), the modem version of section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871.' 6 It will also consider the dangers of importing the § 1985(3) view of
animus into the state VAWAs: the potential rejection of claims involving
nonstranger rapes, mixed-motive rapes, rapes committed by spouses and
domestic partners-indeed, any rape that fails to include a conscious, class-
based, singular and obvious "I hate women" gender motive on the part of
the defendant.
42. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 137 (2d ed. 1999).
43. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52-53.
44. Id. at 64 ("Like the statutes on which it is modelled-title VII, and 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983,
and 1985(3)-[VAWA's civil rights remedy] reaches gender-based discrimination by private
persons and by persons acting under color of State law.").
45. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 49-50 (1991).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994). Section 1985(3) encompasses conduct of private persons
where there is some racial or other class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators' action. Although the text of this law does not include the animus term, the Supreme
Court made it clear in Griffin v. Breckinridge that § 1985(3) was not "intended to apply to all
tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the fights of others," but only to those that were
founded upon "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus." 403 U.S. 101, 101-02 (1971). Animus is now a required element for § 1985(3) redress.
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A. Animus as Conscious, Group-Based, Obvious, and Singular
Bias Motivation
As a political matter, it proved advantageous for the drafters of
VAWA's civil rights remedy to base the remedy on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1982, and 1985(3) and to incorporate some of the language used by courts
in adjudicating claims brought under these provisions. Indeed, the
legislative record chronicling the enactment of VAWA's civil rights
remedy specifically states that § 13981 was "[m]odeled on existing civil
rights laws" 47 and that "[p]roof of 'gender-motivation' under [VAWA's]
title III should proceed in the same ways proof of race or sex discrimination
proceeds under other civil rights laws." 4
The most closely analogous Reconstruction-era civil rights statute to
VAWA's civil rights remedy is § 1985(3), which addresses violent conduct
and has been construed by the Court to require proof of "invidiously
discriminatory animus." 4 9 The key notion of § 1985(3) is the idea of a harm
aimed at a group as opposed to an individual-the idea that a harm can
transcend the personal in that it punishes possession of a trait that is
inherently characteristic of a class identity, in particular, race. As VAWA's
proponents noted, § 1985(3) acknowledges that there is a difference
between private violence and the kind of collective violence proscribed by
the cause of action. The essence of this distinction is believed to be located
in the mind of the perpetrator; that is, the motivation, or animus, for the two
kinds of violence appear to differ. Private violence, for example, is often
undertaken for gain or as an angry response to a particular situation, injury,
or threat, making the choice of victim a personal one. Collective violence
bypasses such personal motivation: The motives for collective violence are
considered to be impersonal, encompassing such motivations as allegiance
to the dominant group and service to the interests of that group or the
beliefs and ideals of that group.5" The legal and social innovation of
VAWA's civil rights remedy was to analogize to a civil rights
jurisprudence that focuses on discriminatory collective violence in
providing for redress from rape and other gender-motivated violence that
had long been considered merely private violence.5
47. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 64.
48. Id. at 52.
49. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101-02.
50. John Ladd, The Idea of Collective Violence, in JUSTICE, LAW, AND VIOLENCE 19, 22
(James B. Brady & Newton Garver eds., 1991).
51. Id. Note the irony in Ladd's use of rape as a specific example of private, not collective,
violence. Id.
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B. Limits of Employing a § 1985(3)-Style Animus in Future State VA WAs
Despite the close analogy, it is important to note that while VAWA's
legislative history did direct courts to look toward § 1985(3) when
analyzing gender-motivated animus under the civil rights remedy, the two
statutes differed in a slight but critical way: Although § 1985(3) requires
proof of "invidious," conscious discrimination, § 13981 does not. This
critical difference counsels against importing a § 1985(3)-style animus
tradition into future state VAWA remedies.
Courts analyzing § 1985(3) claims have looked to circumstantial
evidence of bias to establish the presence of an animus based upon the race
of the victim, 2 and Griffin v. Breckenridge was explicitly cited in VAWA's
legislative history 3 as requiring "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus" as part of a conspiracy to
deprive a person of his rights of citizenship. 4 However, the Griffin Court
made a distinction between this class-based animus5 and the "specific
intent to deprive a person of a federal right," 56 but only class-based
violence satisfies the Civil Rights Act's requirement of discriminatory
animus.
Furthermore, the Griffin opinion comments on Collins v. Hardyman,
which construed the language of § 1985(3) as reaching conspiracies under
color of state law, but not private conspiracies, to interfere with plaintiffs'
rights. 7 Although Griffin takes care to distinguish Collins on its facts,
holding instead that § 1985(3) clearly and constitutionally was intended to
reach private as well as public conspiracies," the public-private distinction
in Collins and the class-based conspiracy requirement in Griffin raise
questions about the applicability of § 1985(3) animus case law to cases of
gender-motivated rape.
Importing distinctions identical to those drawn by Griffin or Collins
into the VAWA context could be dangerous. For instance, Collins's firm
distinction between personal and public conspiracies might cause courts to
limit VAWA civil rights relief to cases involving police officer defendants
committing rapes while within their role as state actors. More relevant to
the animus inquiry, the Griffin requirement of class-based collective and
52. The Court in Griffin inferred a discriminatory intent based on race from the fact that a
group of whites violently attacked a group of blacks and whites thought to be civil rights workers.
Griffin, 403 U.S. at 103.
53. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 51 n.59; S. REP. No. 102-197, at 49 n.69 (1991).
54. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 102 n.10 (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)).
57. Id. at 93 ('" 'The complaint makes no claim that the conspiracy or the overt acts involved
any action by state officials, or that defendants even pretended to act under color of state law."'
(quoting Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 655 (1951))).
58. Id. at95-103.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
142920021
The Yale Law Journal
public violence could create space for courts to narrow the remedy only to
cases involving gang rapes or to exclude rape crimes that take place in
intimate social spaces at the hands of a single defendant. After all,
VAWA's crimes of rape, including interspousal or interpartner rape, often
assail the most private of personal space and still tend to be viewed
overwhelmingly as private acts rather than class-based acts that might also
affect women as a group. 9 Without a more expansive reading of animus
that would cover these classes of rape, such a cabined Griffin-style animus
could cause entire categories of rape to be denied VAWA redress.
A second danger to borrowing from existing civil rights animus
jurisprudence can be found in the Supreme Court's sole decision related to
the meaning of gender-motivated violence in the context of § 1985(3) cases.
In Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, the Court held that acts
opposing abortion did not reflect "invidiously discriminatory animus"
directed at women as a class.' The Court held that since the appellant
antiabortion protesters might have been motivated in their protests by
factors other than discriminatory animus toward women (such as opposition
to abortion), the § 1985(3) claim of discriminatory animus was
insufficient.6 The Court did not consider that there might have been
additional, unstated reasons for the protesters' opposition, including an
underlying "discriminatory animus" toward women, or that opposition to
abortion affects not only individuals seeking abortions but also women as a
class.6"
Clearly, direct application of Bray's § 1985(3) to VAWA civil rights
cases involving rape would be problematic. Were future VAWA
jurisprudence to follow Bray's conceptualization of the term animus, rape
could not be seen as indicative of gender animus as long as plausible
alternative motives also existed. Bray neglects the possibility of mixed-
motive and partial-motive rapes, requiring instead that § 1985(3) animus
violence be clear and obvious, without alternative purposes.63
Of course, in cases of rape, the gender-discriminatory motivation may
not always be so distinct and obvious. Using a narrow § 1985(3)-like
interpretation of animus in future state VAWA cases would be inconsistent
with the purposes of these statutes, as those patterned after § 13981 require
59. See Siegel, supra note 7 (discussing how the notion of family privacy historically has
been invoked to preclude law enforcement officials from protecting the survivors of domestic
violence from their spouses).
60. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269-74 (1993).
61. Id. at 270.
62. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE
L.J. 1281, 1318-20 (1991). MacKinnon posits that the criminalization of abortion violates equal
protection, since "only women can be disadvantaged, for a reason specific to sex, through state-
mandated restrictions on abortion." Id. at 1320.
63. Bray, 506 U.S. at 270.
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only that a gender-motivated crime be "due, at least in part, to an animus
based on the victim's gender." 64 In contrast, interpretations of animus as
articulated by the Court in Bray would constrict the scope of these civil
rights remedies to exclude claims where violence was motivated by more
than a single factor, as is often argued in all but a very narrow class of
stranger rapes.65 A Bray-style animus requirement would therefore result in
dangerously underinclusive state VAWA statutes.66
Taken together, the Griffin and Bray animus inquiries raise concerns
that militate against a blind cloning of § 1985(3)'s conscious, class-based,
singular and obvious animus for future state VAWA remedies.
IV. ANIMUS MEANINGS FROM TITLE VII CASE LAW
VAWA's legislative history clearly indicates that the language of the
civil rights remedy was patterned after Title V1167 as well as § 1985(3):
"The definition of gender-motivated crime is based on title VII .... This
body of [Title VII] case law will provide substantial guidance to the trier of
fact in assessing whether the requisite discrimination was present."68 While
Title VII itself does not include the term animus and is not concerned solely
with violent conduct, this line of jurisprudence often articulates an animus
inquiry that is roughly equated with the statute's "based on" causation
language.69 The courts should therefore expect to find guidance for
applying VAWA's civil rights remedy by looking to existing Title VII
antidiscrimination case law. This Part examines the potential applicability
of Title VII animus analysis to gender violence.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1994).
65. See generally SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987) (addressing the many different
contexts of rape and noting that only violent stranger rapes are consistently deemed to be "pure-
motive" rapes that do not raise questions as to the victim's possible provocation of the rapist to
commit the crime out of greed, jealousy, revenge, frustrated passion, and so on).
66. Some courts considering § 1985(3) cases have routinely used circumstantial evidence to
infer bias-based motivation. See, e.g., Hawk v. Perillo, 642 F. Supp. 380, 392 (N.D. 111. 1985).
Several other trial courts have held that some allegations of discrimination resting on
circumstantial evidence do not sufficiently establish gender-motivated violence for purposes of
satisfying § 1985(3). See, e.g., Valanzuela v. Snider, 889 F. Supp. 1409, 1420 (D. Colo. 1995).
For this reason, the appropriate non-Bray standard for § 1985(3)-style circumstantial evidence
analysis as applied to gender animus remains too unclear to be considered here in detail.
67. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
68. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52-53 (1993); see also E-mail from Joseph R. Biden, Jr., to
author, supra note 8 ("It was our aim to provide critical civil rights remedies for women after
being subjected to gender-motivated violence, just as women have civil rights remedies after
being subjected to gender bias in the workplace or in the classroom.").
69. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52-53 ("The phraseology 'motivated by,' 'because of,' 'on the
basis of' or 'based on' sex or gender is used interchangeably in case law discussions of title
vii.").
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A. Animus as "I-Know-It-When-I-See-It"
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to promote
discrimination-free working environments by forbidding employers from
discriminating in making hiring and other employment decisions "because
of... sex." 7 The law condemns employment decisions based on a mixture
of legitimate and illegitimate considerations. Therefore, when an employer
considers both gender and legitimate factors when making a decision, that
decision was "because of' both sex and the other, legitimate
considerations.
The plaintiff's prima facie burden in Title VII cases is "not onerous,"
requiring only sufficient evidence to support an inference that the employer
acted with a discriminatory motivation." If the employer articulates a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, however, the
presumption of bias vanishes, and the burden of production shifts back to
the plaintiff. The plaintiff must then introduce sufficient evidence to prove
that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not true reasons
but were a pretext for discrimination. 2 The circumstantial evidence must be
sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer that the employer's decision
shows disparate treatment and was motivated by discriminatory animus.73
Equating "discriminatory animus" with sufficient circumstantial
evidence of bias does little to clarify a proper objective meaning for animus
in state VAWA statutes, however. The federal VAWA's legislative history
suggested that Title VII law would provide procedural guidance for
determining the presence of animus, not necessarily a clear definition of the
term itself. Recent Title VII case law typically employs a "totality of the
circumstances" approach to determine whether an employer's actions were,
at least in part, "tied directly to the alleged discriminatory animus." 74
Yet applying such an "I-know-it-when-I-see-it" Title VII approach to
VAWA violence would likely result in contested, arbitrary standards for
ambiguous state animus requirements. Indeed, there has been significant
confusion over when and how to apply mixed-motive discriminatory intent
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Title VII does allow for one circumstance in which an
employer may take gender into account in making an employment decision; namely, when gender
is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business. Id. § 2000e-2(e).
71. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
72. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973)).
73. ld.
74. Ostrowski v. Al. Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992). The ambiguity
surrounding the animus element has led some courts to adopt a strict definition of direct evidence,
while others have adopted a definition that includes circumstantial evidence. See Joseph J. Ward,
Note, A Call for Price Waterhouse II: The Legacy of Justice O'Connor's Direct Evidence
Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Claims, 61 ALB. L. REv. 627 (1997).
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analysis in Title VII claims.75 Are explicit discriminatory statements
required during commission of the violence? Could the method of violence
chosen be sufficient evidence to indicate the presence of animus toward the
victim? Title VII-style animus leaves these issues and standards unclear.
For this reason, Title VIi's circumstantial approach toward finding animus
in the attendant contexts of various VAWA rapes would fail to lift civil
rights redress above the societal myths and inequalities that the states'
VAWA remedies seek to eradicate. Worse yet, it could lead to distinctions
among various kinds of rape, reflective of existing societal biases, that
would likely result in less than universal state VAWA coverage for all
rapes, particularly mixed-motive rapes.
B. Perils with Promise: From Title VII Animus as Defendant- Centered
"Intent" Toward Harm-Based Approaches
Even for paradigmatic cases of rape, the Title VII approach to animus
gives rise to another difficult problem for those seeking to import a Title
VII-like animus inquiry into new VAWA statutes. As animus under Title
VII drifted over time toward a presumption of inherent "intent" for certain
kinds of unwelcome sexual behavior,76 the animus analysis centered the
critical inquiry upon the defendant's intent rather than the harm to the
survivor. If animus is present, this body of jurisprudence would seem to
say, then it will be found in the thoughts and actions of the defendant rather
than in the experience of the victim. Following this reasoning in states'
VAWA civil rights remedies would be troubling: Arguably, an act
intending to redress harms resulting from existing power inequities should
center the critical inquiry upon the nature of the harm inflicted by the
gender-motivated violence.
Despite this operational inadequacy, however, one of the promising
contributions of Title VII jurisprudence to universal VAWA rape coverage
is that sex and gender came to be regarded as equivalent concepts for
purposes of all sex discrimination cases. Successful Title VII cases Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.7 7 and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins"'
75. See Ward, supra note 74.
76. See, e.g., Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 467 (8th Cir. 1996) (explaining
that unwelcome sexual advances could constitute part of a hostile environment sexual harassment
claim and that these acts could constitute prima facie proof of intent for Title IX purposes). Note
that courts have found that the standards for proving sex discrimination under Title IX and Title
VII are the same. See, e.g., Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896 (1st Cir. 1988).
77. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). In Oncale, the Supreme Court held that Title VII protects men from
sex discrimination and harassment regardless of the gender of the discriminating supervisor. Id. at
79-80.
78. 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (holding that sexual stereotyping occurred when a promotion
was denied to a woman on the basis of a partner's comment that the woman was too aggressive
for a woman, was macho, and needed to be more feminine in appearance). Under Price
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
143320021
The Yale Law Journal
held that discriminatory animus included gender identity and sexual identity
bias This development opened up the possibility for successful VAWA
claims for men raped by other men. Schwenk v. Hartford found VAWA's
discriminatory animus requirement satisfied in a case where the defendant
had attacked a member of his own sex.79 Taken together, these cases
illustrate a shifting focus under animus inquiries away from circumstantial
evidence of defendant motive and toward the harm itself."0 Gradually,
courts have begun to accept the theory that whether a given case satisfies
the animus requirement depends less on the identity of the victim or the
circumstantial evidence of motive and more on the effect of violence upon
the plaintiff. Consider the case of a male prisoner raping a fellow inmate in
an attempt to "feminize" and subordinate his victim."' Under such a
Waterhouse, "sex" under Title VII encompasses both sex-that is, the biological differences
between men and women-and gender, the individual's sexual identity or socially constructed
characteristics. Id. at 240-43; see also Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000)
(reading Title VII in light of Price Waterhouse as encompassing both sex and gender).
79. 204 F.3d 1187. The court stated:
[The] question is whether [VAWA] applies to males .... In Mitchell's view, a sexual
attack by one man against another cannot be "gender-motivated" under the Act.
However, Mitchell's interpretation of the statute as a "domestic violence law" that
protects only women is plainly wrong.
[ T]he evidence offered by Schwenk tends to show that Mitchell's actions were
motivated, at least in part, by Schwenk's gender-in this case, by her assumption of a
feminine rather than a typically masculine appearance or demeanor. Accordingly, we
conclude that Schwenk's assertion that the attack occurred because of gender easily
survives summary judgment.
Id. at 1199-202. Note, however, that although the plaintiff's VAWA claim survived summaryjudgment on behalf of the defendant, his claim was rejected on procedural grounds. Id. at 1205.
80. Indeed, Schwenk, building upon Title VII case law, went so far as to reject attempts to
categorize types of harms, instead focusing on the effect of the offending act. The court stated:
The fact that in this case the alleged crime was a sexual assault is sufficient in and of
itself to support the existence of gender-based animus for purposes of the GMVA. Rape
(or attempted rape) is sui generis. As several courts have noted, rape by definition
occurs at least in part because of gender-based animus. The psychological factors that
underlie a particular rape or the conduct of a particular rapist are often complex as well
as extremely difficult to determine. It would be both an impossible and an unnecessary
task to fashion a judicial test to determine whether particular rapes are due in part to
gender-based animus. With respect to rape and attempted rape, at least, the nature of
the crime dictates a uniform, affirmative answer to the inquiry.
Id. at 1203.
81. The Schwenk court cited a prison study focusing on male-on-male rapes:
It is well-documented in both scholarly literature and reported judicial opinions that
young, slight, physically weak male inmates, particularly those with "feminine"
physical characteristics, are routinely raped, often by groups of men. Once raped, an
inmate is marked as a victim and is subsequently vulnerable to repeated violation. The
victims of these attacks are frequently called female names and terms indicative of
gender animus like "pussy" and "bitch" during the assaults and thereafter. After they
are raped, victims are consigned to "passive" female sexual and social roles within the
prison. In contrast, prison rapists commit assaults in part to establish and maintain a
masculine gender.... They conceive their sexual partners as female members of the
prison social order. Thus, as with rape in general, all prison rape occurs "because of'
gender-both that of the rapist and that of his victim.
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conceptualization, Title VII discriminatory animus could potentially be
present in state VAWA cases against defendants who raped either men or
women. This trend in Title VII law reveals the positive influences that Title
VII might have for future state VAWA remedies, both for an empowering
civil right properly centered upon the harm experienced by the plaintiff as
well as for universal rape coverage.
C. Title VII's Disappearing Mixed-Motive "Disparate Impact" Standard
Title VII jurisprudence does offer some guidance and promise for
future state VAWA statutes. However, it would be a mistake for state
legislators to refrain from articulating a meaning for their VAWA statutes'
animus requirements, deciding instead merely to direct state courts to
follow Title VII case law with regard to discriminatory animus analysis.
Although Title VII is the area of law where the Court has provided its most
extensive critique of gender discrimination and stereotyping, the doctrine
that has emerged treats evidence of stereotyping primarily as a method of
proving discriminatory intent in a relatively narrow class of mixed-
motivation cases. It is far from clear that Title VII's line of reasoning would
find discriminatory animus as liberally in cases involving unconscious
class-based animus toward a stereotyped group.82 Imagine, then, the
difficulty of VAWA plaintiffs proving and prevailing upon a gender animus
claim in, say, gang rape cases where their rapists' only purported conscious
motivation may have been a desire to escape rejection from a social group.
In short, borrowing too much from Title VII animus inquiries could
potentially deny VAWA redress for rapes resulting from unconscious
animus motivated by the victim's gender.
Furthermore, over the past decade or so the promise and power of Title
VII intentional disparate treatment theory have been seriously
undermined. 3 The courts also have "been reluctant to extend disparate
impact too far beyond its 'home' in Title VII" jurisprudence.' They have
already ruled that this effects-based standard of liability is not available
under the Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes. 85 In its simplest
formulation, the disparate treatment proscription requires that different
Id. at 1203 n. 14 (citations omitted).
82. See Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and
Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 748-51 (2001).
83. Id. at 751 n.19, 752 n.20 (citing non-Title VII rulings that a Title VII-type effects-based
standard of liability is not available outside of Title VII law, including under the Reconstruction-
era civil rights statutes).
84. Id. at 751.
85. Id. at 751 n.19, 752 n.20 (citing the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 case General Building Contractors
Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982), and the § 1983 decision in Personnel Administrator
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
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social groups be subject to the same rules and standards, at least in
circumstances in which the individuals or groups can be held to be similarly
situated. 6 But in cases coming after Washington v. Davis, 7 which
demanded proof of intent for a race-based Equal Protection Clause claim,
the Court has demanded rigorous proof of discriminatory intent in related
bodies of law, thereby precluding many potential civil-rights-related claims
in which unequal treatment stems from indifference, neglect, or structural
inequities8 (as would be the case in VAWA rapes motivated by gender
biases, which reflect existing societal and institutional structural inequities).
Even within Title VII's own case law, disparate impact cases are
discouraged by the substantial burden that courts now tend to place on
plaintiffs. 9 Often, courts also insist that there be a showing that the
disparate treatment is the product of deliberate decisionmaking on the part
of the defendant (to satisfy the requirement that the discrimination was
"intentional"), and there is currently a serious debate as to whether
unconscious disparate treatment is actionable under Title VII.9°
In sum, then, currently available Title VII legal doctrines remain
inadequate to handle contemporary manifestations of bias against women,
particularly those reflective of the most invidious of existing biases-
unconscious biases so deeply embedded in defendants' worldviews that
they no longer form a conscious component of their decision to rape.
V. ANIMUS IN HATE CRIMES LAW
Over the past decade, much state legislative activity has centered upon
the enactment or revision of a wide variety of statutes criminalizing bias-
motivated violence.9' These statutes generally follow one of three
approaches to defining the defendant's state of mind in committing the
crime: the "racial animus" approach, which requires proof that the
defendant's bias toward or hatred of the victim's characteristics was the
motivation for committing the crime; the "discriminatory selection"
approach, in which proof that victim selection was based on certain
characteristics is the central issue, rather than defendant motivation; and the
much broader "because of" approach, which contains elements of both
86. The classic case of Title VIl-style disparate treatment is International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
87. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
88. See Chamallas, supra note 82, at 748-49 & n.7.
89. See id. at 749-52. Chamallas notes that "courts now tend to impose on plaintiffs [a
burden] to provide refined statistical proof of group adverse impact as part of the prima facie
case." Id. at 752 (citing technical barriers to establishing successful disparate impact claims).
90. Id. at 749 & n.8.
91. See generally LU-IN WANG, HATE CRIMES LAW § 10:1, at 10-1 to -5 (2001) (discussing
the recent explosion of states' legislative efforts in this area).
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racial animus and discriminatory selection in requiring proof that the
defendant was motivated to commit the crime due to the victim's
characteristics 92 Almost all of the state statutes including gender as a
protected category follow this liberal third approach to establishing the
defendant's motivation by gender bias.93
As with Title VII, although hate crime statutes typically do not employ
the term animus, hate crimes jurisprudence often articulates an animus
inquiry set roughly equivalent to the state statutes' "because of" motivation
requirement.' For this reason, when preparing the VAWA civil rights
remedy for passage, Congress's legislative record stated that, along with
civil rights and Title VII law, "accepted guidelines for identifying hate
crimes may also be useful" in helping courts assess whether given crimes
had in fact been motivated by gender animus.9 5 Following this legislative
guidance, courts applying the civil rights remedy in early federal VAWA
cases relied upon traditional hate crime approaches to assessing gender-
motivated animus.96 For this reason, it makes sense to consider whether
understandings of animus borrowed from hate crimes law might contribute
to future state VAWA civil rights remedies.
A. Animus as Conscious or Subconscious "Prejudice"
A promising feature of hate crimes jurisprudence that could prove
useful to future constructions of animus in post-VAWA legislation is that
courts applying hate crime statutes have considered both conscious and
subconscious prejudice relevant to the bias inquiry.97 Almost all successful
hate crime prosecutions include circumstantial or direct evidence of
concrete, conscious, and outwardly manifested prejudice. However, most
bias attacks are mixed-motive crimes. In these cases, it can be difficult to
92. Id. § 10:1 & n.4, at 10-3 (citing 57 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 1 (2000)).
93. See CTR. FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 17, at 14-18.
94. WANG, supra note 91, § 10:1, at 10-3.
95. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52 n.61 (1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 50 n.72 (1991) (using
the same language).
96. Congress cited generally accepted guidelines used by courts for identifying prejudice or
animus in hate crimes: "language used by the perpetrator; the severity of the attack (including
mutilation); the lack of provocation; previous history of similar incidents; absence of any other
apparent motive, . .. [and] common sense.'" S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52 n.61 (citing CTR. FOR
WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 17, at 9). Examples of federal hate crime statutes include
the Hate Crime Statistics Act, 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1994), the Church Arsons Prevention Act, 18
U.S.C. § 247 (1994), and the Hate Crimes Prevention Act (HCPA), 18 U.S.C. § 245. The HCPA
may be used to combat violence motivated by race, religion, or national origin. The statute does
not cover violence motivated by gender or sexual orientation. 18 U.S.C. § 245.
97. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322 (1987) (noting that "Americans share a
common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played and still plays a dominant
role.... At the same time most of us are unaware of our racism.... [A] large part of the behavior
that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation").
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separate crimes partially motivated by prejudicial animus toward the
victim's group from random, nondiscriminatory crimes of violence.
Nevertheless, the value of borrowing from hate crime approaches to
prejudicial motivation is that this jurisprudence acknowledges that the basis
for the bias attack almost always has less to do with tangible gain and more
to do with the sense of superiority and dominance that offenders gain from
the violent and personal violation of a member of a subordinated group.
The crime has the effect of establishing and enforcing a social hierarchy
that places the victim, and by extension the entire group to which that
victim belongs, in a subordinated class.98 The class-based violence is used
to dehumanize victims by stripping them of their individual identities and
treating them as a stereotype, a projected image of the prejudice that resides
within the offender.99 Under this tradition, defendants in hate crime
prosecutions may potentially be found guilty regardless of the degree to
which they expressed conscious prejudice or animus toward the victim's
group in committing the crime.
Such a construction of prejudicial motivation as applied to VAWA
gender animus rapes creates the potential for the argument that all rapes
automatically satisfy these statutes' biased-motive requirement, as rapes
can be understood to be inherently reflective of subconscious gender
prejudice."°
B. Methods and Standards of Proof: Limits to Borrowing from Hate
Crimes Law by Future VAWA Gender Claims
At first blush, borrowing from hate crime approaches to animus for
future state VAWA remedies providing redress for violent, gender-
motivated crimes would appear to make sense. However, there are
important constraints to this analogy that argue against wholesale adoption
of this area of law's approach to animus inquiry.
First, and perhaps most obvious, VAWA proposes to create a civil
rights remedy, not criminal liability. 10 Rather than having the state act as
the prosecuting plaintiff on behalf of the victim, as in the case of criminal
prosecutions, VAWA seeks to empower the plaintiff to sue on her or his
98. See Steven Bennett Weisburd & Brian Levin, "On the Basis of Sex": Recognizing
Gender-Based Bias Crimes, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 21, 23 (1994).
99. See id. at 25.
100. See generally DIANA SCULLY, UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL VIOLENCE (1990) (discussing
the wide range of conscious and subconscious motives of rapists).
101. Indeed, the underlying acts of violence giving rise to federal VAWA violations were
already crimes. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (requiring the commission of a "crime of violence" in
addition to gender-based animus). If anything, state VAWA statutes seek to provide remedial
potential, including damages, for all violent behavior motivated by gender animus, regardless of
whether that conduct is a crime.
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own behalf. Within the context of a new civil right, which is meant to
empower the harmed party, placing too much emphasis upon the
defendant's motivations may not be as appropriate as focusing on the
effects of the harm to be redressed.
Second, courts in mixed-motive hate crime cases are forced to draw
inferences of motivation and intent through "totality of the circumstances"
analyses. Gender hate crimes often differ from other kinds of hate crimes in
that a majority of female victims of violent crimes are intimately acquainted
with their attackers. This fact necessarily gives rise to highly complicated
mixed-motive inquiries that are largely absent from typical hate crimes
directed against blacks, Jews, or other targeted groups where the attacker is
often unknown to the defendant. While the recent inclusion of a gender
category within state hate crime statutes is a welcome development, the
factors for determining the presence of prejudicial motivation within the
context of sex crimes are highly uneven and their elaboration in the courts
remains unclear.
The dangerous result of applying such a "totality of the circumstances"
approach to claims by future state VAWA plaintiffs would be creation of a
hierarchy of rapes, with some acts of rape seen as "worse" than others and
thus deserving of redress, and other rapes emerging as lacking sufficiently
probative indicia of gender bias. Paradigmatic "stranger rape" VAWA
claims might well succeed, but cases involving interspousal, same-sex, or
"provocation" rapes could well fail. For these reasons, no matter what
evidentiary factors will eventually be held most probative of the presence or
absence of gender prejudice in future hate crimes, relying upon traditional
hate crime tests to determine the presence of animus in individual rape
cases is an inadequate approach for state VAWA civil rights remedies
seeking a notion of animus that will provide remedial potential for all
claims of rape.
VI. VAWA JURISPRUDENCE OF ANIMUS-MUDDIED CONSTRUCTIONS,
FROM "HATRED" TO "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES"
One final source of guidance for state legislators considering the
possible meanings of animus for future state VAWA statutes is the federal
VAWA jurisprudence created before the Supreme Court's 2000 decision
that terminated the civil rights remedy.
When the federal courts in 1995 began to apply VAWA's imprecise
animus language to actual § 13981 claims, the resulting interpretations were
confused and muddied, illustrating the dangers of drawing meanings from
civil rights, Title VII, and hate crime law in the absence of a clearly defined
animus element. Most courts turned to congressional history and these
analogous bodies of law in the hope that they would illuminate the meaning
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of this ambiguous term. Others, perhaps more sensitive to charges of
judicial activism in the face of unclear congressional motives, construed the
civil rights remedy as tentatively and restrictively as possible.
Soon, however, three distinct categories of interpretation concerning
standards required for a successful animus claim emerged: one set of ideas
employing a "totality of the circumstances" analysis, including the intent
of the perpetrator, finding animus as a matter of fact on a case-by-case
basis; another set of ideas based upon the levels of aggression shown in any
given VAWA claim's context; and, finally, a third set of ideas advancing
tentative notions that certain violent acts indicate inherent discriminatory
bias as a matter of law.
10 2
A. "Rape-Plus": Intent Determined by the Totality of the Circumstances
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision striking down VAWA's civil
rights remedy as unconstitutional, only a handful of district court decisions
addressed the meaning of the term "animus." 103 Perhaps, in retrospect, it
was reasonable to expect that developing case law under VAWA would
reflect traditional gender biases, rape myths, and gender stereotypes
prevailing over the view suggested by Senator Biden that some acts of
violence against women may be inherently gender-motivated. 1"
Congress indicated in VAWA's legislative history that the
determination of whether a crime was gender-motivated was to be a
question of fact.' °5 This was, in part, due to the "totality of the
circumstances" analysis employed by the related, albeit not identical,
jurisprudence of Title VII, hate crimes, and § 1985(3) civil rights claims,
which also made use of this type of animus inquiry. The result was a case-
by-case evaluation of the act of violence in context, rather than an approach
that found § 13981 satisfied for certain crimes as a matter of law. However,
102. For her helpful commentary on earlier versions of these arguments, I am indebted to
Professor Judith Resnik at Yale Law School.
103. See Jugmohan v. Zola, No. 98 Civ. 1509, 2000 WL 222186 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2000);
Culberson v. Doan, 65 F. Supp. 2d 701 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 42 F.
Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Kan. 1999); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999); Ziegler v. Ziegler,
28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Kuhn v. Kuhn, No. 98 C 2395, 1998 WL 673629 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 16, 1998); Braden v. Piggly Wiggly, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (M.D. Ala. 1998); McCann v.
Rosquist, 998 F. Supp. 1246 (D. Utah 1998); Mattison v. Click Corp., No. 97-CV-2736, 1998 WL
32597 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998); Crisonino v. New York City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. I1. 1997); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F.
Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779
(W.D. Va. 1996).
104. See Shalit, supra note 1, at 14.
105. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49-50 (1993) ("[ T]itle HI requires subjective proof on a
case-by-case basis that the criminal was motivated by a bias against the victim's gender. Whether
a particular crime is, in fact, gender-motivated will be a question of fact for the court or jury to
decide.").
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due to the confusion over the meaning of this particular term, courts were
often divided over whether a given fact pattern provided sufficient evidence
to meet the animus requirement necessary to state a claim.
The earliest example of this category of VAWA case law was the
district court's decision in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State
University.1" The case offered a confused analytic treatment of what
crimes, under which circumstances, might be covered by the civil rights
remedy. The opinion framed the case by initially noting that "[j]udges and
juries will determine 'motivation' from the 'totality of the circumstances'
surrounding the event."' 07 "'Bias, in short, can be proven by circumstantial
as well as indirect evidence."' "
The Brzonkala court then invoked the hate crimes calculus, as
previously suggested by Congress, in order to determine whether the
circumstances of the case showed gender motivation. The court appeared to
focus particularly heavily on the hate crimes jurisprudence's consideration
of the absence of any other apparent motive to determine the presence of
animus by a process of elimination.
Ultimately, the Brzonkala court decided that a rape of a female college
student showed sufficient gender animus, because, "by process of
elimination, an inference of gender animus is more reasonable in this
situation than in some other rapes.' 9 The court described the
characteristics of various types of rape and proceeded to explain which
types of rape it viewed as the most egregious, expressing the view that
"stranger rape generally more likely than date rape involves gender
animus"' -a "rape-plus" standard that requires proof of animus above
and beyond the act of rape.
The Brzonkala court opined that not all rapes are the same-that, in
fact, some rapes are worse than others and that not all rapes contain an
element of gender animus. The court asserted that, in the case of rape, the
presence of an animus based on gender is more likely when there is no
personal relationship between the rapist and the victim. In short, it said that
stranger rapes have fewer alternative explanations to an animus motivation.
Thus it is harder to make a successful claim when a rape occurs in the
context of an intimate relationship, where other motivations for the rape
may also exist. The court further asserted that date rapes are less likely to
contain an element of gender animus because a "man's sexual passion"
may" decreas[e] the man's control."
106. 935 F. Supp. 779.
107. Id. at 784 (quoting S. REP. No. 102-197, at 50 (1991)).
108. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52).
109. Id. at 785.
110. Id. at 784-85.
111. Id.
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In sum, Brzonkala sought to categorize rapes into those that likely
contained a gender animus and those that did not, based on the
characteristics of the rape and any other evidence that might assist in a
process-of-elimination hate-crimes-based analysis. This necessitated proof
of animus above and beyond the sexual violence-bias explicitly stated by
the defendant during commission of the rape, or some other tangible or
observable indication that could be offered into evidence-in effect
resulting in a "rape-plus" threshold. In Crisonino v. New York City
Housing Authority,' 2 the court would later mark the beginning of a broader
embrace of the "totality of the circumstances" calculus, but despite the
broadening of fact patterns eligible for § 13981 relief, Crisonino preserved
the "plus" requirement for successful VAWA claims."'
Brzonkala and others' "totality of the circumstances" for § 13981
animus were limited to ad hoc examinations of each claim in context. Yet
under this approach, a deeper question concerning the VAWA civil right
remained unresolved: Does a "rape-plus" totality-of-the-circumstances
approach really imbue the VAWA civil right with the kind of
transformative power to promote sex equality that its drafters envisioned, or
would it become a mere reflection and perpetuation of existing structural
inequities?114 The danger in a Brzonkala-like rape categorization is that
some motivations for rape may be seen as eligible for § 13981 relief while
others may not be. Gang rape performed under peer pressure to impress
other men would not be actionable. Rape due to desire for sex would not be
eligible. Rape of prostitutes, combined with a commodified view of sex that
minimizes the harm to the unwilling woman, would not be covered." 5 In
this way, a Brzonkala approach would merely reflect and perpetuate the




Following Brzonkala, Anisimov v. Lake began by stating that Congress
"did not intend to designate rape as a per se 'crime of violence motivated
by gender,' 17 thereby following Brzonkala's characterization that "[a]ll
112. 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
113. Id. at 391.
114. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 888-94 (2001) (advancing the notion
that sex inequality under law is a reflection and reinforcement of structural sex inequality within
the state).
115. See SCULLY, supra note 100 (citing numerous studies on the multiple motivations of
rapists).
116. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE (1989) (discussing persisting structural gender inequities); Siegel, supra note 7 (discussing
historical structural gender inequalities).
117. Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531,541 (N.D. I11. 1997).
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rapes are not the same." 18 While not completely abandoning Brzonkala's
concern with intent,"' Anisimov disagreed with the broad characterizations
and categorizations of rape made in Brzonkala. The court created a new
category of interpretation that found gender animus in cases where there
had been sufficiently severe inappropriate sexual advances."' In other
words, the court engaged in levels-of-aggression analysis.
Liu v. Striuli"' represented a further elaboration of an animus
interpretation based upon levels of aggression. In Liu, the court cited
Kinman v. Omaha Public School District'22 in noting that previous courts
interpreting the requirement of gender-motivated conduct for purposes of
Title VII liability had held that proof of unwelcome sexual advances is
sufficient to meet the intent element of that statute."' It also referenced the
hate crime guidelines. Yet in Liu, forced sexual intercourse was not the only
ground upon which the court found the animus requirement of § 13981
satisfied. The court also held that the alleged pattern of physical and
emotional abuse, including the rapes, the lewd comments, and the threats ofdeportation, along with the lack of any other apparent motive, was
sufficient to warrant the conclusion that Striuli's conduct was gender-
motivated."
Other cases began pushing on a related front-that of lowering thedefinition and the bar of severity of violence that would be required for a
successful § 13981 animus claim. In Culberson v. Doan, for example, the
court noted that an attempted assault, although unsuccessful, combined with
a threat to the plaintiff to "stay away from other men," was sufficient to
constitute gender animus. 2 Yet again, despite the increasing inclusiveness
of these cases, this construction of the animus element as applied to the
civil rights context suffered from a significant conceptual and operational
118. Id. at 540 (quoting Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 783(W.D. Va. 1996)).
119. The court stated:
During the hearings, Congress renounced "the widespread belief that people who ae
raped precipitate in some way." ... In light of the language and stated purpose of theVAWA, whether Anisimov voluntarily entered Lake's car or office is no more relevant
to her civil rights claim than if an African-American family voluntarily moved into a
"white neighborhood" and found a burning cross on their lawn. Neither victim "askedfor it," and the focus of the Court should not be diverted from the actions of the
defendant to those of the victim.
Id. at 541 (citation omitted).
120. In Anisimov, this included "fondling [the plaintiff], attempting to remove her clothing,grabbing her breasts, assaulting and attempting to rape her, and ultimately luring her to a deserted
office site and raping her." Id.
121. 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999).
122. 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996).
123. Liu, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 474 (explaining that unwelcome sexual advances may constitutepart of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim).
124. Id. at 474-76,
125. 65 F. Supp, 2d 701, 706 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
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flaw. As with the "totality of the circumstances/intent" approach, the cases
relying upon "level of aggression" centered the relevant animus analysis on
the perpetrator and his acts, thereby largely failing to address the survivor
and the inflicted harm, as felt by both the individual and the broader gender
class. Moreover, the jurisprudence following this path began to create
artificial distinctions between types of rapes (as did Brzonkala), this time
seeking to distinguish between "real rape" 126 of a highly violent nature and
"nontraditional rape," involving less force than "real rape." 127 Inevitably,
the line demarcating the threshold level of aggression needed to support a
successful § 13981 claim was inconsistent, fuzzy at best, and arbitrary
almost by definition. Most seriously, however, a threshold tied to a level-of-
aggression approach precluded claims by women who had not been
sufficiently coerced into rape in the view of the court.
C. Fledgling Notions of "Inherent Animus"
Soon, however, a third set of ideas emerged in the jurisprudence of
animus: that certain acts, in and of themselves, were inherently
discriminatory against women because their effect was to degrade women
or symbolize women's inferiority. Building off of a blend of the first two
approaches, Doe v. Hartz' was one of the earliest cases to move toward
finding certain sexual assault crimes inherently indicative of gender animus.
Making the point that animus should not be equated with "dislike," the
plaintiff's brief in Hartz argued that "forcing physical intimacy on a
woman, whether with a kiss or through rape, illustrated lack of respect and
therefore ongoing gender-motivated animus against women." 2 9 The court
then held that allegations of unwanted or unwelcome sexual advances are
sufficient to meet the requirement to allege that the defendant "targeted [the
victim] on the basis of his or her gender" and "had a specific intent or
purpose, based on the victim's gender, to injure the victim." 130 Such
unwanted conduct suggested that the actor relegated women as a group to
an inferior status without regard to their individual qualities. 3 ' Finally, the
Hartz court drew on Title VII case law, invoking the idea that motive does
not matter, but that effect-the nature of the harm-does:
Again, because unwelcome sexual advances may be demeaning and
belittling, and may reasonably be inferred to be intended to have
126. See generally ESTRICH, supra note 65, at 3-4 (charging that society considers only
violent stranger rape to be "real rape").
127. Cf. id. (discussing society's traditional distinctions among rapes).
128. 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
129. Id. at 1406.
130. Id. at 1408 (citing S. REP. No. 103-138, at 64 (1993)).
131. Il
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that purpose or to relegate another to an inferior status, even if the
advances were also intended to satisfy the actor's sexual desires,
the allegations of the "animus" element here are sufficient.'32
In essence, the court was revealing its intuition that, independent of the
actor's motives, the acts contained in the Hartz fact pattern inherently
indicated animus as a matter of law under § 13981, although the Hartz court
stopped short of holding animus to be inherent in all sexual abuse. 33
McCann v. Rosquist134 went a step further, stating that the legislative
history made it clear that the animus required by the statute is "something
akin to a 'gender bias"' and then opined that all nonconsensual sexually
mandated conduct is invidiously discriminatory toward the victimized
class.'35 The court held that whether the actor's motivations were amorous
or not was irrelevant when considering whether inappropriate liberties had
been taken, as mixed-motive acts need only contain partial animus motive
to violate § 13981. McCann thus came to stand for the proposition that all
nonconsensual expressions of affection were inherently laden with
disrespect for women. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit stated more explicitly
that "it is a bizarre view of equality indeed to suggest that some abstract
principle of sex equality requires legislatures and courts to ignore the
degree to which sexual violence is overwhelmingly and specifically
directed against women" ' 6-suggesting that it might be appropriate to
consider a form of strict liability for purposes of gender animus in the case
of sexual violence. Again, however, both the trial and appeals courts
declined to hold that these disrespectful sexual acts disproportionately
directed at women were per se sufficient to prove § 13981 gender animus.
Meanwhile, Kuhn v. Kuhn, 37 a case involving sexual violence within
marriage, revealed a lingering blind spot in the tentative new approaches of
Hartz and McCann. The Kuhn court appeared to demarcate the limits of
inherent animus: Within domestic relations, acts that otherwise indicate
animus per se would become subject to a tougher standard more closely
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 998 F. Supp. 1246 (D. Utah 1998).
135. Id. at 1252. The court stated:
The notion that non-consensual sexually oriented conduct is actually amorous and
therefore not invidiously discriminatory toward the victimized class is clearly wrong.
The legislative history makes clear that the animus required is something akin to a
"gender bias." . .. Regardless of the amorous intentions of the perpetrator, non-
consensual expressions of affection that rise to the nature of those alleged in this action
are laden with disrespect for women.
Id. at 1252-53.
136. McCann v. Rosquist, 185 F.3d 1113, 1119 n.9 (10th Cir. 1999).
137. No. 98 C 2395, 1998 WL 673629 (N.D. 11. Sept. 16, 1998).
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resembling a "totality of the circumstances" test akin to that in
Brzonkala.138
Such is hardly the stuff of which successful per se claims based on
demeaning nonconsensual sexual activities might be made. But other cases
soon followed to challenge this interpretation. Mattison v. Click Corp. 13 9
followed Hartz in intimating that sexual assault crimes might be crimes
committed "'because of or 'on the basis of the victim's gender."'" In
Mattison, the defendant maintained that the "longstanding sexual
relationship" between the actor and the survivor disproved animus toward
the plaintiff.'4' The court disagreed, saying that the degrading behavior,
exclusive of the eventual rape, showed that the defendant had been
"consumed by a desire to subordinate, demean, humiliate and
intimidate." 142 While Mattison used a blend of "intent" analysis and
"inherent animus" assertions, the case advanced the notion that certain
behaviors might be considered inherently violative of the VAWA civil
right. The court, however, declined to enumerate exactly which violent
crimes might fall into this category. Indeed, only one federal court case,
Schwenk v. Hartford, appeared to adduce a per se animus standard when
considering the case of a sexual assault of a transsexual man. Ultimately,
however, the plaintiff's VAWA claim failed on qualified immunity grounds
and thus the case did not establish strong precedent.'4 3
Ziegler v. Ziegler1" enumerated the most specific list of acts considered
to show gender animus: rape; gender-specific epithets; acts that perpetuated
the stereotype of submissive roles for the plaintiff within a marriage; severe
physical attacks, particularly during pregnancy; and violence without
provocation, when the plaintiff attempted to assert her independence.'45
Significantly, Ziegler was a spousal abuse case as well. As courageous as
Ziegler was in planting a stake even deeper into the territory of inherent
138. Id. at *6 ("The interplay between plaintiffs gender and her status as a
wife ... require[s] a greater evidentiary exposition.").
139. No. 97-CV-2736, 1998 WL 32597 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
140. Id. at *6 (quoting Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1406 (N.D. Iowa 1997)).
141. Id. at *7 n.18.
142. Id. at *7.
143. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1203 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The fact that in this case
the alleged crime was a sexual assault is sufficient in and of itself to support the existence of
gender-based animus for purposes of the GMVA."). Despite the opinion's clear support for a per
se animus standard in certain cases, the court held that the defendant (a state prison guard) was
entitled to qualified immunity because the applicability of the GMVA to the defendant's conduct
was not clearly established at the time of the assault. Id. at 1205 ("Thus, although we now hold
that a violation of state laws regarding rape or sexual assault necessarily constitutes a violation of
the GMVA regardless of the actor's motivation, state of mind or emotions, we also hold that the
law regarding gender motivation and animus was not clearly established at the time of the
assault.").
144. 28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
145. Id at 606-07.
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animus, the case buttressed these " per se" assertions with Title VII and
hate crime approaches, in addition to "level of aggression" analysis. 4
By the time of Braden v. Piggly Wiggly, 147 a court was prepared to note
in dicta that " it can be reasonably argued that an allegation of sexual
violence ... is itself indicative of gender animus and is therefore sufficient
to show gender motivation and gender animus, as required by the
VAWA." 4 ' The court then went on to express its puzzlement at the
artificial distinctions between supposedly different categories of rape
perceived by Brzonkala and concluded by remarking that "rape is rape"
and that no legal or sociological authority would support a finding of
"inherent animus" in some rapes but not others.'49 Unfortunately, the court
ultimately held that the plaintiffs claim could not proceed unless she
amended her complaint to include allegations of gender animus beyond the
fact that the defendant had "sexually assaulted" her.15
However, these district courts did not succeed in providing a strong
jurisprudential interpretation for animus. Struggling to determine those
crimes for which an inherent inference of gender animus might be
reasonable, courts once again attempted to distinguish among different acts
of sexual violence against women. From the generic distinctions presented
in Brzonkala"'5 to the attempt to widen the remedy's coverage in Braden,
opinions splintered over the correct application of the animus element.
These three broad categories of judicial interpretation-one centered on
"rape-plus" intent and context, one centered on threshold levels of
aggression, and one seeking to identify acts disclosing "inherent
animus" -provide a spectrum of possible modes of analysis for § 13981's
animus element. None of the opinions, however, offered a unitary or clear
vision of a potentially definitive and transformative meaning of animus.
Some observers likely believed that this was for the best, allowing for case-
by-case consideration of the violent act, its harm, and the motivation of the
perpetrator. But the result was that VAWA was interpreted in a nonuniform
146. The opinion in Ziegler noted that "[g]ender motivation is to be determined from the
totality of the circumstances." Id. at 606 (citing S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 50 (1991)).
147. 4 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
148. Id. at 1362; see also id. ("'Women are sexually assaulted because they are women: not
individually or at random, but on the basis of sex, because of their membership in a group defined
by gender ... ' (quoting MacKinnon, supra note 62, at 1301-02)).
149. Id. at 1362 n.4.
150. Id. at 1362.
151. Recall that the district court in Brzonkala attempted to distinguish among different acts
of sexual violence against women in an effort to determine the crimes for which an inference of
gender animus would be reasonable, going so far as to subcategorize different kinds of rape. Yet
the Brzonkala opinion cited no sociological or legal authority to support this distinction.
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matter, with determinations based largely upon the biases and social views
of individual courts. These decisions reflected and further entrenched
already existing myths of rape and gender status and therefore did little or
nothing to promote the advancement of sex equality.
What are the advantages of adopting part or all of one or more of the
available constructions explored in the previous Sections? How would a
given meaning and method of searching for animus affect the scope and the
operation of new state VAWAs? And which approach would most support
VAWA's vision for gender equality?
VII. TOWARD A TRANSFORMATIVE MEANING FOR VAWA ANIMUS
In the wake of the federal VAWA, the scope of contemporary
antidiscrimination law is exceedingly narrow. There still exists a large gap
between conduct that is formally prohibited by law and conduct that should
properly be regarded as racist or sexist. Within this sociolegal context, we
now are challenged to turn to state-based approaches for continuing the
work of the invalidated federal version of a VAWA civil rights remedy for
sexist violent crimes.
Now that the federal civil right is gone, state legislatures are freed from
the fetters of precedent, legislative intent, and prior jurisprudential
traditions. Ideally, we should seek a meaning that would operate to
proscribe violence, including all rapes, that perpetuates existing gender
inequalities. We should strive to construct such an animus within state
VAWA statutes that will both advance the federal drafters' vision of a
remedy that promotes and reflects a social view of gender equality and, at
the same time, make possible the successful passage of these bills by the
states' legislatures. The former consideration dictates an animus that
reflects the nature of both the individual and the collective harms inflicted
through rape by deeming all rapes to be per se indicative of such an animus
and therefore actionable under the new state VAWA remedies. The latter
requires an acknowledgment of political opponents' fears of an unbounded
remedy in the hands of activist judges and will require an animus with
sufficient meaning to provide concrete guidance to the state courts.
A. VAWA Civil Rights Remedies as Transformative Legal Instruments
This Section briefly considers the role that state VAWA civil rights
remedies can play within a society committed to gender equality among its
citizens.
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Some feminist legal scholars have suggested that the law is "male" in
that the law sees and treats women as men see and treat women. 52 The
federal VAWA, progressive as it was, reflected society's prevailing view of
rape, as did other areas of antidiscrimination law:
[Rlape is a man's act, whether it is a male or a female man and
whether it is a man relatively permanently or relatively temporarily;
and being raped is a woman's experience, whether it is a female or
a male woman and whether it is a woman relatively permanently or
relatively temporarily.
53
The old federal VAWA case law resulted in legal blind spots
surrounding violence in certain settings, particularly relationship rapes. It
focused upon the socially normative minimum required level of force at
which coerced sex could be deemed actionable rape (as seen in the level-of-
aggression approach). It also defined animus rape in male sexual terms
when distinguishing cases of coerced sex from VAWA rape depending
upon the (usually male) defendant's conscious discriminatory motivation
(as seen in the "rape-plus" approach). None of these past approaches is
therefore truly transformative of existing (and legally legitimated) social
power inequities, as each falls short of providing redress for all cases of
rape.
1. Scope: Why Universal Coverage for All Rapes?
The new state-based VAWAs open up possibilities for a statutory
animus element free from previous constructs long embedded in other
existing areas of federal law. To be successful civil rights remedies, the new
state statutes must contain animus terms whose meanings focus upon the
choice of crime as presumptively determinative of impermissible gender
motivation. The crime of rape manipulates the very identity characteristic-
gender-that defines the victim's class as the subordinated, gender-female
group; the commission of the crime further reinforces the existing social
hierarchy. This is true of all cases of rape, whether committed by a stranger
or not, whether a heterosexual rape or not.1 54 Contrary to the belief of
152. See MACKINNON, supra note 116, at 155-251.
153. Carolyn M. Shafer & Marilyn Frye, Rape and Respect, in FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
333, 334 (Mary Vetterling-Braggin et al. eds., 1977); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 336 (1977) (equating rapability with the female gender in a Title VII case). See generally
SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL (1975) (discussing the historical and legal
legitimation of forced intercourse on the basis of gender-female status).
154. See generally ESTRICH, supra note 65 (detailing the harms common to all incidents of
rape); MICHAEL SCARCE, MALE ON MALE RAPE 35-36 (1997) (discussing the use of same-sex
rape to create an internal power hierarchy within communities of men).
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Senator Hatch and others, rape is never caused by mere "lust" "' or sexual
passion. 56 While rape is often a mixed response to a constellation of
factors,'57 gender animus is an underlying factor in all rapes.' 8 The
contention that gender animus is necessarily present in all acts of rape may
be argued on two grounds: First, the American socialization process
exposes and reinforces a social hierarchy, with " male" defined as dominant
and "female" defined as subordinated, and a rapist harbors a conscious or
unconscious gender animus that reflects this hierarchy.'59 Second, rape
intrinsically is a forced means of asserting power and control over women,
which subordinates women, individually and as a class.
America's socialization process with regard to gender roles and sexual
behavior has deep historical roots and is reflected in and reproduced by
myriad sexual stereotypes in popular culture and the history of the common
law. 6 ° Rape began as a property crime against the man, typically the father
or husband, 6 ' to whom the victim "belonged"; marital rape was considered
a legal impossibility for centuries. 162 Sexual stereotypes continue to foster a
societal framework conducive to rape, reinforcing social rape myths
excusing or minimizing the seriousness of rape.'63 American culture, tainted
with a collective subconscious gender animus, reflects and promotes
155. See Shalit, supra note 1, at 14 (quoting remarks on rape by Senator Hatch suggesting
that some rapes are simply natural responses to sexual desire rather than animus).
156. See UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 49-62 (Nancy A. Crowell & Ann
W. Burgess eds., 1996) (debunking the myth that rape is an expression of excess romantic passion
or sexual desire).
157, Id. at 52-58 (noting, among other things, that sexual offenders have been diagnosed with
a wide variety of psychiatric and personality disorders).
158. This Note defines rape as "unwanted sexual contact obtained without consent through
the use of coercion or force or misrepresentation. Sexual contact can be intercourse, oral sex, anal
sex, or vaginal and/or anal penetration with objects." Brande Stellings, Note, The Public Harm of
Private Violence: Rape, Sex Discrimination and Citizenship, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 185,
185 n. 1 (1993). This Note maintains that all of these rapes contain an element of gender animus.
A small set of legally defined rape, therefore, might not be actionable. Left open by the remarks
by Senator Biden, supra text accompanying note 2, is the possibility that this definition would not
cover some individual cases of statutory rape where a rape is held to have legally occurred only
due to the age of the parties rather than due to any "coercion, force or misrepresentation."
Stellings, supra, at 185 n. I.
159. See SCULLY, supra note 100, at 166 (reporting on an interview with a rapist who said:
"Rape is a man's right. If a woman doesn't want to give it, a man should take it. Women have no
right to say no. Women are made to have sex. It's all they are good for"); see also
BROWNMILLER, supra note 153, at 389 ("The theory of aggressive male domination over women
as a natural right is so deeply embedded in our cultural value system that all recent attempts to
expose it... have barely managed to scratch the surface.").
160. UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 156, at 62-69.
161. BROWNMILLER, supra note 153, at 18.
162. ESTRICH, supra note 65, at 72 (" [T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by
himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath
given up herself in this kind unto her husband." (quoting 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (Prof'I Books 1971) (1736))).
163. See generally Susan Griffin, Rape: The All-American Crime, RAMPARTS, Sept. 1971, at
26, reprinted in FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 153, at 313 (discussing various rape
myths embedded in American society).
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violence against women as a way to enhance social status at the expense of
the victim. 64 Thus every rape may be seen as an expression of gender
animus that exists at a broad societal level.
Gender animus is expressed in the feminization of the victim, who
becomes subordinated to the offender's dominance through manipulation of
the victim's gender status. This manipulation compromises the victim's role
as a political citizen. This Note therefore argues that all rape must be
considered a per se display of gender animus toward women as a group.
2. Operation: How Should the States' New VA WA Animus Function?
As a true transformative civil right that aims to restore power equality,
the new statutory regime must operate in a way that returns the focus from
the defendant and his or her mental state to the effect of the harm upon both
the victim and society.
165
Rape, like many other crimes, requires that the accused possess a
criminal intent, or mens rea. The defendant's mental state refers to what he
actually understood at the time or to what the "reasonable man" should
have known under the circumstances. This is a problematic approach in the
case of rape, where the true harm lies in the meaning of the act to its victim,
but the standard for the act's criminality lies in its meaning to the assailant.
Doctrinally, this has meant that the man's perceptions of the woman's
desires determine whether she is deemed legally violated.'66 An analysis
that determines the presence of animus in this way is fated both (1) to fail to
redistribute power by centering on the defendant's motives rather than on
the harm; and (2) to engage in an evidentiary inquiry, applying the totality
of the circumstances test or some other consideration of additional
contextual factors that reduces the presence of animus to a matter of fact
and thus merely reflects existing societal gender animus. This is the result
of defining animus as "hatred," "intent," or "purpose."
For the new animus term properly to capture and resolve this difficulty
within the context of a civil rights remedy, animus must be
reconceptualized as an inherent byproduct of the choice of a defendant to
commit a rape that reflects and reinforces existing societal gender
inequalities. Animus should be evidenced neither by the defendant's motive
nor by a disparate impact calculus, but by the defendant's choice of rape as
164. See generally id. (discussing the subconscious notions of gender inequality that pervade
American society).
165. Some have proposed that the defendants' prejudice in cases of sexual violence should be
presumed and that the burden of proving lack of animus should be shifted to the defendant. See,
e.g., Jennifer Gaffney, Note, Amending the Violence Against Women Act: Creating a Rebuttable
Presumption of Gender Animus in Rape Cases, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 247 (1997).
166. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 114, at 817-33 (discussing the doctrinal standards for
asserting victim "consent" or insufficient resistance to sex in rape prosecutions).
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a method of using the victim's class-based gender characteristic to effect
the victim's sexual and social subjugation. In short, the defendant's choice
of a particular crime of violence-here, rape-should be considered a per
se showing of animus for purposes of an effective future state-based
VAWA remedy.
The remainder of this Note takes into account the aforementioned
considerations in creating the proposed new meaning for state VAWAs'
animus and also considers some political realities surrounding successful
passage of these civil rights remedies.
B. Guidance to Courts: A Transformative Legal Meaning for Animus
Concerned with deeply embedded political inequities in existing state
laws, those engaging in legal experiments designed to transform the status
of women through the law have questioned whether the law should in fact
be the primary tool for this work, or whether law should be rejected as a
dangerous y and irreparably flawed tool of the biased authority of the
state.' 67 This Note posits that it is possible both to reject existing biased
legal frameworks and to recognize the transformative value of the law:
Creating a civil right as an expression of legally supported gender equality
requires a public discussion and collective decision that ultimately advances
creation of new public norms supportive of equal citizenship. Within the
context of an epidemic of gender violence, the pragmatist's cooptation of
the system promises faster remedial results than the purist's abdication of
the struggle. To that end, I now propose a new legal definition of animus to
be applied by state courts in future VAWA claims.
1. Animus as "Attitude Informing One's Actions"
To reconceptualize a new meaning for animus, we must consider the
appropriate elements of typical past VAWA rape claims, which raised,
among other things, the following four issues:
(1) the motive(s) or intent(s) of the defendant;
(2) the type of violent crime committed;
(3) whether the defendant's actions implicated the gender identity
of the victim; and
(4) the impact or result of the crime upon the victim.
167. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 116.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1452 [Vol. 111: 1417
"Animus" for State VAWAs
I have noted that approaches to animus in the § 13981 rape case law
focused primarily on one or another of these four basic issues. Each of these
approaches left us short of universal coverage for all rapes. Each of the
evidentiary inquiries therefore undermined the transformative potential of
the federal remedy.
This Note proposes a reconceptualized definition of animus in which
animus does not equal hate. Animus should not be imbued with a
requirement of "intent" or "purpose" -words that inappropriately invoke
criminal law, center the analysis on the defendant rather than the victim,
and insinuate a requirement of conscious motive. Nor should animus focus
exclusively on the impact on the victim, particularly since disparate impact
is not enough under a weakened antidiscrimination jurisprudence. The
solution proposed by this Note is that animus should simply mean that the
defendant in a VAWA rape claim was motivated by gender status to select
a crime in which existing social gender hierarchies are manipulated in order
to effect the harm upon the plaintiff.
Such an animus would do several critical things. It would allow the new
VAWA remedy to capture both conscious and unconscious motivations. It
would center the inquiry on the nature of the harm and on what is done to
both the individual and the individual's group when an act of violence
implicating sexuality occurs. It would reflect the systemic nature of the
harm by recognizing the unconscious ways in which societal attitude-
toward women, status, and violence-works upon the citizenry's
conceptions and distributions of power. Finally, it would make possible a
robust civil right that provides for relief, both in damages and in political
recognition of society's goal of gender equality. All rapes would be covered
under this approach.
To effect this migration of meanings from a single-element approach to
one that blends all four holistically, state-based VAWAs must embrace an
animus defined as "[a]n attitude that informs one's actions; disposition." '68
An elaborate intent inquiry would be eliminated; burdens of proof would be
claimant-centered and would be relieved of evidentiary inquiries that
merely reflect existing inequities. No artificial distinction would be made
among factual backdrops. This definition would be more sensitive to the
particularities of gender inequality; gender animus in rape cases would
become a question of law, reflecting our collective subconscious
disposition, rather than a case-by-case factual inquiry. The proof of the
defendant's gender-motivated "disposition" would rest within the nature of
the act itself and its effects on both the individual and the individual's
social group. In short, the new animus would lift out our deeply embedded
notions of the feminine as a subordinate gender and hold them to a legal
168. AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 54 (3d ed. 2000).
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light of zero tolerance of violence as a tool for reinforcing structural gender
inequalities.
2. A Brief Consideration of Political and Legal Realities Facing State
VAWA Proponents
Ironically, the demise of the federal VAWA has created opportunities
for state legislatures to reopen the debate over the proper meaning of
animus in state statutes and to amplify the remedial potential for future
state-level VAWA remedies. However, we must remember that VAWA's
drafters borrowed the term for political reasons as well: Not only did its
invocation cloak the fragile new civil rights statute in the now politically
unassailable rhetoric of previous civil rights legislation, but it dampened
opposition through the use of an inherently ambiguous term that created
critical space within which to build consensus among the various liberal
and conservative forces in Congress.' 69 For similar reasons of political
necessity and symbolic value, animus is the term that most likely will be
employed by the currently emerging state statutes as well. 7 '
Clearly, a statutory word can come to mean many things, as was the
case for animus in various bodies of federal law. It is a "familiar 'maxim
that a statutory term is generally presumed to have its common-law
meaning.' ... And as noted by the Court in Morissette v. United States,
"where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal
tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and
adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached. . . and the meaning its use
will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed." 172 The danger
for state VAWA statutes, of course, is that states will fail to reconceptualize
existing notions of animus as elaborated in the available bodies of Title VII,
civil rights, and hate crimes law. As this Note has illustrated, such
borrowings from imperfect legal analogues would prove as problematic as
the inconsistent body of case law produced by the federal VAWA in federal
courts. Absent a clearly defined meaning for "animus," state courts would
169. In this respect, VAWA's legislative history, which was marked by a wide variety of
rhetoric reflecting legislators' various opinions on the proper meaning of the animus term,
mirrored that of Alice's rhetorical exchanges in Wonderland:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, "it means just
what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." "The question is," said Alice,
"whether you can make words mean so many different things." "The question is,"
said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LoOKING-GLAss 124 (Macmillan 1999) (1871).
170. See supra Part I (discussing the political advantages attending the deployment of a term
laden with content of high political significance).
171. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259 (1992) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495
U.S. 575, 592 (1990)).
172. 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
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similarly be free to apply the remedy more broadly or restrictively than
intended by legislatures, creating potential for less-than-universal rape
coverage for future VAWA plaintiffs.
These dangers therefore make explicit legislative application of this
Note's new animus meaning critical to preserving the optimal remedial
potential for future state VAWA statutes. At the same time, however, I
recognize that it may not always be possible to incorporate this meaning
directly as statutory language into the text of the remedies. (Indeed, as seen
in Illinois, use of expressly broad alternative language that fails to invoke
the political protections afforded by an animus term could well result in a
bill that is not substantially different in operational scope in cases of rape
but might never become law.).. 3 Nevertheless, as noted by the Morissette
Court, we should not trust that courts will interpret animus broadly absent
clear legislative guidance. Pragmatic considerations with respect to this
need for a clear expression of legislative intent therefore dictate the need to
incorporate, at a minimum, direction within the legislative record
accompanying the statute to adopt this reconceptualized notion of VAWA
animus.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While this country's laws have fought discrimination on the basis of
race for more than 130 years,174 we have failed to extend that level of legal
protection to victims of gender-motivated violence even while our citizens
are being violently victimized at extraordinary rates. 7 Promising an
extension of civil rights law to include explicitly the right to be free from
gender-motivated violence, § 13981 of the federal VAWA reflected the
growing recognition that gender-based violence has the power to affect
women as a class and to restrict women's constitutional freedom to exercise
their equal rights of citizenship.
At the same time, the foregoing analysis uncovers the ways in which
previously available constructions of the federal VAWA have been wholly
insufficient to provide the kind of political relief originally envisioned by
VAWA's drafters. The Supreme Court's recent decision to declare
VAWA's civil rights remedy unconstitutional has created an opportunity
for state legislatures to establish an identical § 13981 civil right at the state
173. See supra note 15 (discussing the circumstances surrounding the stalled Illinois VAWA
remedy).
174. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which extended basic civil rights to
African Americans, was ratified on July 9, 1868. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
175. See NAT'L VICTIM CTR. & CRIME VICTIMS RESEARCH & TREATMENT CTR., RAPE IN
AMERICA 2 (1992); see also UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 156, at 1
(providing estimates of the increasing incidence of gender-based violence in the United States).
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level. This time, however, the politically necessary statutory element of
animus will be free from the constraints of previous federal jurisprudences
and statements of legislative intent, offering an opportunity for drafters of
state VAWA remedies to create a truly transformative and effective cause
of action for victims of gender-motivated violence.
The meaning given to this one elemental term will largely determine
the remedial scope and operation of the fledgling state VAWA remedies as
applied to all cases of rape. Animus as an "attitude informing one's
actions" is the key to reaping the political benefits of deploying a historical
statutory term while also ensuring that the states' emerging responses to the
federal VAWA's recent demise remain true to its original vision for a
society free from rape and other discriminatory gender-motivated violence.
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